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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Defendant and Appellant, Norman H. Rowe respectfully petitions the 
Utah Court of Appeals for rehearing with respect to the Court !s 
decision in the above captioned matter entered November 19, 1993. 
BACKGROUND 
The case arises from the orders of Commissioner Maetani and 
Judge Christensen of the Fourth District Court. The orders 
essentially adopted a stipulation of the parties dated September 
10, 1989, in the order to show cause hearing held March 17, 1992. 
The stipulation had been rejected by the Court in 1989 for failure 
to comply with the applicable child support guideline statutes. 
Without taking any further evidence to show compliance with the 
applicable statutes, the Fourth District Court adopted the 
stipulation. 
ISSUE ON REHEARING 
Does a District Court Commissioner have to comply with 
statutory requirements in ruling on a modification petition? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court misapprehends the failure of the Commissioner to 
comply with the governing statutes pertaining to the modification 
of an existing decree. The Court overlooks the facts in the record 
indicating that Mrs. Rowe had in effect nothing upon which to bring 
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an order to show cause and that in law a stipulation of the parties 
cannot bind the Trial Court and is only binding upon the parties 
once it has been incorporated into an order of the Trial Court. 
That this had not been done prior to the hearing that gave rise to 
this action is not in doubt. Therefore, the Commissioner had 
before him a disputed petition to modify an existing divorce 
decree, not the enforcement of an ancient stipulation in 
noncompliance with the applicable statutes. Lastly, neither the 
findings in the Commissioner's Order nor Mrs. Rowefs arguments 
comply with the facts in the record - a matter which Mr. Rowe 
submits this Court has overlooked. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Compliance With Statute Required. The Legislature has 
clearly said that when the Commissioner has before him a 
modification request, he must obey the following: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7. Determination of amount of support 
Rebuttable guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount 
granted by prior Court Order unless there has been a material 
change of circumstances on the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(2) If no prior Court Order exists, or a material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the Court 
determining the amount of prospective support shall 
require each party to file a proposed award of child 
support using the guidelines before an Order awarding 
child support or modifying an existing award may be 
granted. 
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(3) If the Court finds sufficient evidence to rebut 
the guidelines, the Court shall establish support after 
considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation 
of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the 
obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor 
and the obligee for the support of others. 
If the matter is uncontested, the Court then has to follow the 
following: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.3 Procedure -- Documentation -
Stipulation 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving 
party shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not 
the amount of child support requested is consistent with 
the guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required 
under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified 
representation of the defaulting party's income by the 
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moving party, based on the best evidence available, may 
be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may 
only be offered after a copy has been provided to the 
defaulting party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative 
Procedures Act, in an administrative proceeding. 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving 
parties shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not 
the amount of child support requested is consistent with 
the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall 
be used to review the adequacy of a child support Order 
negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined 
child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if 
the stipulated child support amount or combined amount exceeds 
the total child support award required by the guidelines. 
When the stipulated amount exceeds the guidelines, it may be 
awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-7.2. 
Whether the matter is contested or uncontested, it is obvious 
that the Legislature wanted some documentation under oath from the 
parties to indicate that the guidelines had been substantially met. 
That the Commissioner did not do this on the March 17 Order to Show 
Cause hearing is not argued. (See page 10 of Appellee's Brief 
where it is admitted.) With both parties agreeing to the non-
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compliance and the record devoid of any compliance, how can this 
Court sustain the actions taken by the Court below? 
II. The Stipulation of the Parties Not Binding on the Court. 
The Stipulation heretofore submitted by the parties is not binding 
upon the Court, and the Trial Court has complete discretion to set 
it aside if it so chooses. See Kline vs. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 
1975); and as the Utah Supreme Court said in Clawson vs. Clawson, 
675 P.2d 562 (Utah 1983), "Stipulations of the parties to an action 
are only advisory to the Court and the Court is not bound by them." 
In the instant case, the Stipulation was submitted to the 
Court, together with a proposed Order (R Pg. 166, Paragraph 17: 
Addendum #11, Paragraph 17). However, the Court feeling that the 
Stipulation did not meet the requirements of the Child Support 
Guidelines Statutes of the State, requested further documentation 
from both parties (R Pg. 116, Paragraph 18: Addendum #11, 
Paragraph 18) . When they both failed to supply it, the Stipulation 
was rejected and the case dismissed. 
The record in this case is devoid of any child support 
worksheets, financial verification or written statements indicating 
that the child support in the Stipulation was consistent with the 
Guidelines. Clearly, in signing the Order the Trial Court violated 
this statute. Further, the Commissioner failed to follow Rule 4-
504 of the Code of Judicial Administration which states: 
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(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon 
stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the 
stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the 
clerk or the stipulation was made on the record. 
A careful review of the record indicates that the Stipulation 
was neither signed by respective counsel, nor read into the record. 
Thus, by adopting it, the Court violated this rule, and renders its 
Order unenforceable. 
In 1989, when the documentation was not forthcoming, the Court 
quite correctly rejected both the Stipulation and the proposed 
Order, and both documents were returned by the Court through its 
clerk to the defendants attorney, who had mailed them to the Court 
(R Pg. 165, Paragraph 20; R Pg. 87: Addendum #5). 
Further, based upon the failure of either party to provide the 
necessary documentation, the Court on its own motion, dismissed the 
case on April 15, 1991 (R Pg. 96; Addendum #7). Therefore, since 
the Stipulation had been rejected by the Court, it was not a valid 
document upon which Mrs. Rowe could bring an order to show cause 
and not a document which the Court could adopt without complying 
with the statute. 
III. Findings of the Order Not Supported by Facts: 
(a) In Paragraph 2 of the Order, it states that the parties 
entered into a Stipulation on September 10, 1989, prepared by 
Norman Rowe!s attorney, and that the Stipulation was never filed 
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by his attorney. This finding in the Order is manifestly incorrect 
since the documents and Affidavits filed with the Court on March 
25, 1992, clearly indicate that the Stipulation was filed with the 
Court, and was rejected. (See Affidavit of Graham Dodd and 
accompanying documents from the Clerk of the Court returning the 
Stipulation and Order, Addendum #!s 5 and 11). That the 
Commissioner committed error, there can be no doubt; for in the 
transcript of the hearing held on March 17, 1991, the Commissioner 
concluded in ten (10) difference places that the Stipulation was 
never filed. (R Pgs. 492, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 501, and 502; 
Addendum #10) This could have been avoided had he read the file 
before him and his own clerk's letter (R Pg. 87: Addendum #5). 
IV. Plaintiff & Appellee's Arguments Not Based Upon the 
Record. 
Plaintiff alleges that she sent the Stipulation to the Court 
on September 26, 1989 along with a cover letter indicating that 
she was not represented by counsel; however, the record does not 
show the original of this letter, nor is this statement supported. 
In fact, a copy of it does not show up in the record until March 
17, 1992, 2 1/2 years later, submitted by plaintiff's attorney at 
the Order to Show Cause Hearing held March 17, 1992 (R 103 and 
109). Contrary to this, the letter from the Commissioner's clerk 
to defendant's attorney rejecting the Stipulation and Order was 
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mailed on January 18, 1990, indicating that he was the one who in 
fact filed the documents (R Pg. 87) . The foregoing shows the 
confusion in the mind of the plaintiff in remembering the facts. 
However, it is clear from the defendant's letter of September 10, 
1990 that the parties had earlier discussed the matter and 
plaintiff knew that the Stipulation had not been accepted by the 
Court (R Pg. 191; Addendum, Exhibit 4) and in his affidavit, 
defendant further states "he advised her (plaintiff) of the same" 
(R Pg. 193, 17; Addendum, Exhibit 5). In addition, the plaintiff 
was not being paid the $900.00 per month required by the 
Stipulation (see R Pgs. 173-189; Addendum, Exhibit 6) and defendant 
told her this in early 1990 (R Pg. 191 Addendum, Exhibit 4) . 
Further, the statements in plaintiff's letter pertaining to her 
being not represented by counsel are not correct since plaintifffs 
attorney did not withdraw until October 20, 1989, well after 
September 26 of the same year (R Pg. 86; Addendum, Exhibit 7). In 
addition, contrary to plaintiff's statements of fact that she was 
not notified, both the Court's Order to Show Cause (R Pg. 88; 
Addendum, Exhibit 8) and its Order of Dismissal (R Pg. 96; 
Addendum, Exhibit 9) show that plaintiff was copied by the Court. 
In addition, the defendant notified plaintiff himself (R Pg. 193 
17; Addendum, Exhibit 5) . Therefore, the record shows that the 
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plaintiff was well notified that the Stipulation had been rejected 
by the Court, 
The only part of the Trial Court's Order which is on all fours 
with the facts in the record is that Mr. Rowe paid to Mrs. Rowe the 
sum of $12,600.00 which represented two months child support at 
$800.00 per month, and $11,000.00 to satisfy arrearages to obtain 
a satisfaction of judgment from an administrative court of the 
State. But this exchange of money for the judgment release was 
done on October 6, 1989, before the stipulation had been submitted 
to the Trial Court, and at a time when both parties thought the 
Court would accept it. (See record page 136 for copy of receipt.) 
By rejecting the stipulation submitted in 1989, the Court rejected 
all of its parts--including the exchange of money for the 
satisfaction of judgment upon which the Commissioner now claims to 
rely. Besides which, Mrs. Rowe received full consideration for the 
satisfaction. There is nothing in the record to show otherwise, 
or that she has been prejudiced or damaged by the exchange. For 
the Commissioner to conclude that the satisfaction of judgment in 
exchange for the $11,000.00 was grounds for enforcement of the 
Stipulation without taking additional evidence was simply error. 
This Court should not condone that error by affirming the action. 
Even if the Stipulation had been adopted by the Commissioner in 
1989, Mr. Rowe would still have had the right to challenge it due 
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to material change of circumstances. This is his right by law. 
This has effectively been denied him by the Commissioner. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rowe submits that the record in this case is clear. The 
Commissioner had before him on March 17, 1991 a petition for 
modification. The law in Utah is clear on the procedure and duties 
of the Trial Court in adjudicating modifications. The Commissioner 
did not follow the statutes and did not follow the rules of court. 
In addition, by its prior acts, the Trial Court had rejected and 
rendered void the Stipulation. Neither the findings in the 
Commissioner's order, nor the arguments of Mrs. Rowe are supported 
by the record. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should prevent a 
miscarriage of justice and strike its prior order affirming the 
lower court's orders entered on the 19th day of November 1993 and 
reverse the lower court's actions as being in contravention of the 
applicable statutes and not in keeping with the facts of the case. 
Respectfully submitted on the 3rd day of December, 1993. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
'Gfaham Dodd 
Attorney for Norman H. Rowe 
Defendant & Appellant 
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CERTIFICATION 
The undersigned certifies that the Petition for Rehearing is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
Dated on this the 3rd day of December, 1993. 
^HSraham Dodd 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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